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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20020595-CA

DOUGLAS DILLON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of one count each of failure to
respond to an officer's signal to stop, theft, and burglary, all third degree
felonies, and misdemeanor traffic violations.

R. 164-64.

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for

burglary?
Standard of review. Because defendant did not preserve this issue below,
this Court will review it only for plain error or exceptional circumstances. State
v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, Tf 112, 32, 55 P.3d 1131 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT

74, Tff 11, 17, 10 R3d 346).

This Court will also review an unpreserved

sufficiency claim to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to
preserve the issue. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, \ \

18 19

" /

42

P.3d 1248.

"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law/' State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, If 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citing
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
2.

Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor improperly questioned

defendant on cross-examination, has defendant demonstrated prejudice?
Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse the jury's verdict on the
basis of prosecutorial misconduct if defendant demonstrates that '[1] [t]he
actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it
would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, [2] if so,
under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is substantial
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable result/" State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268
(Utah Ct. App 1998) (quoting State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (additional quotations omitted) (alterations in original)).
Defendant objected to only one of the allegedly improper crossexamination questions. Therefore, as to the other questions, defendant must
demonstrate that plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances exist. See

2

State v. Vean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13, 95 P.3d 276 ("appellate courts will not consider an
issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional
circumstances") (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11,10 P.3d 346).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the

following

constitutional provision and statute, the relevant portions of which are
reproduced below.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .
have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST, amend. VI
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-202 (West 2004)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State charged defendant by amended information with one count each
of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, theft, and burglary, all third
degree felonies, driving with a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, and
improper passing and speeding, both class C misdemeanors. R. 103-04. After a
series of pre-trial delays, mostly necessitated by repeated changes in defense
3

counsel, the case was tried to a jury on 29 April 2002. R. 4,30, 58, 81,153-54. The
jury convicted defendant as charged.

R. 164-67. The trial court entered its

judgment and sentence on 6 June 2002. R. 160-63. Defendant filed a pro se
timely notice of appeal on 21 June 2002. R. 170. Trial counsel filed a second
notice of appeal on 16 July 2002, after the trial court ordered "the appeal time
period to be stayed from 6/21/02 thru [7/15/02] to allow for timely filing of the
notice of appeal/' R. 174,175.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant leads police on a high-speed chase

On 18 May 2000, Detective Copeland of the Hurricane police department
was on routine patrol. R. 190: 70-71. Sometime between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00
p.m. he encountered defendant driving a truck with Arizona license plates. R.
190: 71.

Detective Copeland maneuvered his unmarked police car behind

defendant's truck to run a check on defendant's license plate.

R. 190: 71.

Defendant "instantly made a U-turn" and then a series of right-hand turns. R.
190: 71-72.
Detective Copeland activated the lights below his rear-view mirror and
defendant pulled over. R. 190: 72,109. Detective Copeland got out of his car and
approached defendant's truck. R. 190: 72. As Detective Copeland neared the
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back of defendant's truck, defendant "punched it and took off down the road/'
R. 190: 72.
Defendant led Detective Copeland on a high-speed chase for about three
and a half miles. R. 190: 75. Defendant eventually stopped when he saw other
police cars approaching from the opposite direction. R. 190: 75-76. Defendant
explained to the officers that he ran because he was driving on a suspended
license. R. 190: 77.
Officers discover holt cutters and stolen tools in defendant's truck
When Detective Copeland requested defendant's wallet, defendant said
that it was in the console of his truck. R. 190: 77. While looking through the
console, Detective Copeland observed several tools in the back seat of
defendant's truck.

R. 190: 77.

Many of the tools were marked "Zitting

Construction" or "Zitting Brothers/' R. 190: 78, 81. Detective Copeland also
located bolt cutters in defendant's truck. R. 190: 99.
Detective Copeland asked defendant how long he had had the tools and
defendant replied "a short time." R. 190: 78. When Detective Copeland asked
"How long is a short time?" defendant replied, "A couple of weeks." R. 190: 78.
After booking defendant into jail, Detective Copeland and another officer
returned to the area where defendant was first seen and found a construction
trailer that had been burglarized. R. 190: 82. Police contacted Bill Zitting, the

5

owner of the trailer, who came and verified that tools had been stolen from the
trailer. R. 190: 83,157,171. Mr. Zitting explained that he had locked the tools in
the trailer around 5:00 p.m. the previous evening. R. 190: 159,173. Mr. Zitting
also verified that the tools that were found in defendant's truck belonged to
Zitting Construction and were the tools that had been taken from the trailer. R.
190: 86, 157. All of the tools that were stolen from the construction trailer were
discovered in defendant's truck. R. 190:152.
Officers found a padlock in the dirt next to the trailer. R. 190:101-03. The
padlock itself was not cut, but Detective Copeland testified that it appeared
someone had used bolt cutters to cut the trailer's hasp—the mechanism that
connected the lock to the trailer.

R. 190: 92, 103, 105-06.

Based on his

observations, Detective Copeland believed that it would have been easier to cut
the hasp rather than the lock because the hasp was thinner. R. 190: 106. Mr.
Zitting also believed, based on his observations, that the hasp had been cut with
bolt cutters because the hasp was "pinched and separated" where it had been
cut. R. 190:176.
Back at the jail, Detective Copeland interviewed defendant after defendant
waived his Miranda rights. R. 190: 94-95. Defendant claimed he had purchased
the tools from a man for $300 but could not provide any information identifying
this man. R. 190: 95-96.

6

Defendant's story
At trial, defendant denied that he burglarized the construction trailer. R.
190: 241. He claimed that he had purchased stolen tools from Al Flori at a Days
Inn motel around 9:00 p.m. or 9:30 p.m. on the evening of the burglary. R. 190:
230, 232-34, 235. However, defendant could not remember exactly which of the
stolen tools in his truck he had purchased from Flori. R. 190: 231, 247-48.
Defendant believed the bolt cutters were his because he did not remember
purchasing them from Flori. R. 190: 231. Defendant claimed that he had been
purchasing used tools from Flori "for years/7 R. 190: 230-31, 241. When the
prosecutor asked defendant why he did not tell Detective Copeland Al Floras
name, defendant responded that he "just didn't want to give it to him." R. 190:
248.
Defendant testified that he drove off after Detective Copeland initially
pulled him over because Detective Copeland "didn't appear to be a cop." R. 190:
236. Defendant testified that Detective Copeland was not in uniform, nor was he
in a "cop car." R. 190: 236.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court did not plainly err, nor was counsel ineffective for
allowing the burglary charge to go to the jury, because the evidence amply
supported defendant's burglary conviction. Detective Copeland first spotted

r

defendant's truck in the same area as the burglarized construction trailer, and the
jury could infer that defendant was guilty based on his flight from Detective
Copeland. All of the tools that were stolen from Mr. Zitting's construction trailer
were discovered in defendant's truck less than six hours after Mr. Zitting locked
them in the construction trailer. A pair of bolt cutters was also discovered in
defendant's truck and both Detective Copeland and Mr. Zitting testified that,
based upon their observations, it appeared that someone had gained access to the
trailer by cutting the hasp with bolt cutters.

Moreover, defendant gave

conflicting explanations as to why he possessed the stolen tools.
II. Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor asked some improper questions
when cross-examining defendant, and that the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged
misconduct. Even without the allegedly improper questions, the jury would
have convicted defendant based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
ARGUMENT
I. THE EVIDENCE AMPLY
BURGLARY CONVICTION

SUPPORTED

DEFENDANT'S

Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his
burglary conviction.1 Aplt. Br. at 13-19. He argues that there was no evidence

1

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his other convictions.
8

establishing that the bolt cutters in his truck were used to cut the hasp on the
trailer. Aplt. Br. at 16. He also notes the officers' failure to take any fingerprints
at the crime scene. Aplt. Br. at 16-17. Defendant also argues that the evidence "is
not inconsistent" with his story that he purchased the stolen tools earlier that
evening. Aplt. Br. at 18.
Because defense counsel did not raise this issue below, defendant must
demonstrate that plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances exist. State v.
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ^ 12, 32,55 P.3d 1131 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
W 11,17,10 P.3d 346). Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve the issue. Br. Aplt. at 18-19. Defendant cannot demonstrate
plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective assistance of counsel.
A, No error, let alone plain error, occurred because
overwhelming evidence supported defendant's burglary
conviction; nor has defendant shown that exceptional
circumstances exist
"To demonstrate that plain error occurred in the context of a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must show 'first that the evidence
was insufficient to support a conviction of the ctime[s] charged and second that
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in
submitting the case to the jury/" Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at ^ 32 (quoting Holgate,
2000 UT 74 at f 32). To determine whether the evidence was insufficient, this
Court will "first examine the record to determine whether, 'after viewing the
9

evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
jury's verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crimefs] for which he or she was convicted/" Diaz,
2002 UT App 288 at \ 33 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at % 18). Only if this Court
finds that the evidence was insufficient will it inquire "'whether the evidentiary
defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case
to the jury/" Id.
No reasonable juror would have had a reasonable doubt about defendant's
guilt.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the reasonable inference from the

evidence is that he used the bolt cutters in his truck to cut the trailer hasp. See
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at | 33 (holding that in the context of a sufficiency
challenge, all inferences from the evidence are drawn "in a light most favorable
to the jury's verdict"). Detective Copeland first spotted defendant's truck in the
same area as the burglarized construction trailer. R. 190: 71, 82. All of the tools
that were stolen from Mr. Zitting's construction trailer were located in
defendant's truck less than six hours after Mr. Zitting locked them in the
construction trailer. R. 71, 86, 157, 159, 173. A pair of bolt cutters was also
located in defendant's truck and both Detective Copeland and Mr. Zitting
testified that, based upon their observations, it appeared that someone had
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gained access to the trailer by cutting the hasp with bolt cutters. R. 190: 99, 92,
103, 105-06, 176. Defendant's flight from Detective Copeland also supported a
reasonable inference of guilt. See State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) ("Although flight is not absolute proof of guilt, it may support a reasonable
inference of guilt") (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,789 (Utah 1991)).
Perhaps most damming were defendant's conflicting explanations for his
possession of the stolen tools. Defendant first told Detective Copeland that he
had had the tools for "[a] couple of weeks" and had purchased them from
another man. R. 190: 78,95-96. However, defendant could not provide the man's
name or any other identifying information.

R. 190: 95-96. Defendant told a

different story at trial. He testified that he had purchased the tools from a longtime associate named Al Flori around 9:00 p.m. on the evening of the burglary.
R. 190: 230, 232-34,235.
Furthermore, defendant could not explain at trial how the stolen tools
ended up in his truck. When asked on direct examination to explain how he
acquired the stolen tools, defendant gave a series of rambling and disjointed
responses, taking nearly two pages of transcript before he finally explained that
he purchased the tools from Flori. R. 190: 229-31. Even then, defendant could
not remember whether Flori had sold him all of the stolen tools that were
discovered in his truck. R. 190: 231, 247-48. When asked whether the tools that

n

Flori sold him were "[t]he same ones that were in your [truck] that. . . evening?"
defendant responded:
See that, I know it there was a, there was a handful of . . . Yeah, they
were the same ones. But I don't know what I had in any truck or
w h a t . . . I know he gave me four or five power tools, and they were
Dewalt.
R. 190: 231. Officers did recover from defendant's truck a Dewalt sander, router,
and saw that had been stolen from the Zitting Construction trailer.
Exhibit 12, contained in an unpaginated manila exhibit envelope.)

(State's

However,

officers also recovered from defendant's truck a tool belt, level, staple gun,
Hitachi nail gun, Hitachi router, and a Skilsaw saw, all of which had also been
stolen from the Zitting Construction trailer. State's Exhibit 12. Therefore, even
assuming that defendant actually did meet Flori and purchased "four or five
[Dewalt] power tools" from him on the night of the burglary, defendant did not
explain how the other stolen tools ended up in his truck. Defendant's failure to
explain his possession of the stolen tools, his inconsistent stories, his flight, and
the testimony of the State's witnesses provided overwhelming evidence of his
guilt.
The officers' failure to take any fingerprints at the crime scene does not
render the evidence insufficient.

Finding defendant's fingerprints on the

burglarized construction trailer certainly would have made the State's case
stronger, but the lack of such evidence does not render the evidence that was
12

introduced at trial "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime[s] for which he or she was convicted/" Diaz, 2002 UT App
288 at 1f 33 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 18). Moreover, it is unlikely that the
officers could have located defendant's fingerprints on the burglarized trailer
because defendant would not have had to touch the trailer to open it. Rather,
after using the bolt cutters to cut the hasp, defendant could have also
manipulated the bolt cutters to remove the padlock and open the trailer doors.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence was inconsistent with his
explanation of how he obtained the stolen tools. As noted above, defendant
provided inconsistent explanations about how he obtained the tools. Moreover,
defendant's story that he purchased "four or five [Dewalt] power tools" from
Flori on the night of the burglary, R. 190: 231, did not explain the presence of the
other stolen tools in his truck.
Even if the evidence were consistent with defendant's trial testimony, that
did not prevent the jury from convicting defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Assuming that defendant had testified that Flori sold him all of the stolen tools
that were found in his truck, the jury still could have rejected defendant's
testimony and convicted him beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Widdison,
2000 UT App 185, Tf 53, 4 P.3d 100 ("when two reasonable inferences or
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hypotheses exist, one consistent with innocence and another consistent with
guilt, the jury can conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt") (citing State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). In fact,
the jury likely found that defendant lacked credibility because his trial testimony
was inconsistent with his initial statements to police.
In sum, defendant has not shown that the evidence was "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime[s] for
which he or she was convicted/"

Diaz, 2002 UT App 288 at | 33 (quoting

Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 118). On the contrary, the only reasonable interpretation
of the evidence is that defendant possessed Mr. Zitting's stolen tools because
defendant burglarized the trailer and stole the tools. Therefore, defendant has
failed to show that any error, let alone obvious error, occurred in submitting the
burglary charge to the jury.
Nor has defendant demonstrated that exceptional circumstances exist.
Exceptional circumstances arise only when "rare procedural anomalies" occur.
See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at Tf 12. Defendant does not even argue, let alone
demonstrate, that any such "procedural anomalies" occurred. Therefore, his
claim fails.

14

B. Because overwhelming evidence demonstrated that
defendant committed burglary, his counsel was not
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict.
Because overwhelming demonstrated that defendant committed burglary,
any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence would have been denied.
Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a directed
verdict on that charge. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, \ 19, 42 P.3d 1248
("since any objection to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial would have been
denied, Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it").
Consequently, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also fails.
II. DEFENDANT'S PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM
FAILS FOR LACK OF PREJUDICE
Defendant argues that several of the questions that the prosecutor asked
him on cross-examination were improper and amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct. Aplt. Br. at 20-28. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly
asked him, four times, whether he believed that Detective Copeland was lying
about various facts in Detective Copeland" s testimony that conflicted with
defendant's testimony. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. Defendant also complains that the
prosecutor improperly inquired about his criminal history by asking "Well, did
you ever buy stolen tools before?" and also twice asking defendant whether his
reaction was to flee when fearful of being "in trouble with the law." Aplt. Br. at
25-26.
15

Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel objected to only one of the
allegedly improper questions. Aplt. Br. at 2, 25. Therefore, defendant argues
that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask the other
allegedly improper questions. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Defendant cannot show plain
error because he cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the allegedly
improper questions.
This Court "will reverse the jury's verdict on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct if defendant demonstrates that '[1] [t]he actions or remarks of [the
prosecutor] call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in
considering in determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of
the particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more
favorable result/" State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah Ct. App 1998) (quoting
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (additional quotations
omitted) (alterations in original)).
Assuming arguendo that the questions about which defendant complains
were improper, and that these errors should have been obvious to the trial court,
defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. As discussed above, the evidence in
this case overwhelming established defendant's guilt.
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Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, he cannot establish
"a reasonable likelihood that, [absent the prosecutor's alleged misconduct], there
would have been a more favorable result.'" Basta, 966 P.2d at 268. Therefore, his
claim fails.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted Jib

August 2005.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
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